COMMENTARY - SESSION 6
Comments on MEDIA AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
by Steve Sherman

Narcissism seems to be a major component of professional journalism.

Francis Fitzgerald, acknowledged by her peers on this panel as the smartest among them, relegated the American troops to "irrelevancy." The panel lauded Walter Cronkite, wise old uncle of America's television viewers, who justifiably "spoke Truth to Power" when he judged the Tet Offensive to be a significant communist victory. Who are these people to hold such power over our affairs in a democracy? Have they come that far from the days of Yellow Journalism where competing publishers can vie over which of their rags could lead the nation to war?

Dan Rather and the moderator, Brian Williams, in deference to their mentor, side-stepped the secondary question implied in the tabled interrogative: "why is it the popular perception that the Tet offensive was a sweeping defeat for American forces?" What if the "Cronkite moment" had been a statement to the effect that the Communists, in a misjudged effort to initiate the General Uprising phase of traditional Insurgency doctrine, had been soundly defeated by the South Vietnamese regional and irregular forces? The Southern insurgents, intentionally sacrificed by their Northern allies, were decimated. And the attendistes or fence sitters in the cities were finally forced to recognize who and what the enemy was. Such a truthful reporting would have done honest service to the American public, but only was made long after the Cronkite damage was done by reflective journalists like Don Oberdorfer and Peter Braestrop.

It seems like a favored tactic by journalists to ask their "victims" if they are ready to apologize. No one on this panel was willing to ask Francis Fitzgerald to admit her errors to the anti-war protesters who relied on her pretentious book [1] (or on what they heard about it) for their insights into the Vietnamese character? Or to the Vietnamese people, who are still waiting for the “narrow flame of revolution to cleanse the lake of Vietnamese society” of corruption, which is now far worse than anything that existed under the former South Vietnamese banner? Of course, she won’t. She continued to maintain, in this venue, that "there was never any political alternative to Vietnamese Communists."

Even admitting that "in the seventies, the South was almost so-called pacified. . . . you could drive around in most places", she could not see that the fate of the Vietnamese people lay in the hands of whoever's ally cut off the funding for the war.

None of the journalists participating in this conference, including Keynoter Halberstam and Vietnam-era veteran Bob Herbert, demonstrated any insight into the conduct of war or foreign policy that should encourage viewers/readers to rely on their information to a greater degree than the elected/appointed officials who are tasked constitutionally with the conduct of those policies. As stated earlier, they constitute their own form of "Lying Machine," but one which usually, but not always, functioned as a result of incompetence rather than malice, and one which, due to its chroni-omnivorous cycle, dwarfs the output of the other estates.

Looking at some of the statements made in this panel, we see Dan Rather convinced that a Washington official "didn't know what he was talking about" when he described armor operations near the Fishhook. The 11th Armored Cav operated in that part of III CTZ from September 1966 to March 1971 and, during the "Cambodian Incursion", swept through the border at that point.[2] In 1972, NVA tanks moved through that corridor on the way to Saigon. So much for Rather's feel for the tactical terrain.

As a junior officer in Vietnam, I don't believe I lied to any of the few newsmen I met. (I didn't know enough to have secrets to protect.) But I did see sufficient samples of mis-reporting, that I give reporters little, if any credibility. As Hagel, Clarke and Peterson acknowledged in the next session, we "didn't know anything." So much for the relevance of "what everybody who was actually fighting the war knew [about] what was happening." As to the statement that "military people, in order to have a career, were under enormous pressure to go with the flow when it came to [a particular] subject," I wasn't career military, but by the end of my tour in Vietnam, i.e., after enduring both the Tet offensive and the reportage of it, I would have told any reporter whatever I thought would be helpful to the life expectancy of my buddies, and done so under no pressure at all.

After watching the telecast news conferences of Gulf War One (parodied so adroitly by Saturday Night Live) I thought about offering a cash award to whatever soldier could convince a reporter to publish the most outlandish whopper. ("That water carrier over there is really a prototype for an Unmanned Armored Assault Vehicle.") I was going to call it the Peter Arnett Memorial Award. Common sense got the best of me for a change and I didn't follow through.

In Vietnam, journalists were living off the good will left over from World War II. The unrequited assistance from GI's and air crews built the reputation of many of today's big names. Given the way they repaid their parents and uncles, it is a wonder today's military personnel are willing to offer any similar aid.

There were some very enlightened statements made in this (and in some other sessions) which need to be highlighted here, lest they be lost within the overall direction of the discussion. John Burns reported that "To discover the power of doubt, skepticism, in this country about the war, is a very informing thing for me. To read about it is one thing. To experience it directly is another." Each of the presenters offered similar observations: Fitzgerald (the previously quoted "when you were there in the seventies, the South was almost so-called pacified. I mean you could drive around in most places."), Rather ("many of the people who fought the Vietnam War, and don’t try to defend the political decisions, do take the view to this day. And it is at least worth considering. And to put it forward is not to say that I agree with it. The view that the mistake in the Vietnam War was not to go totally to war.") and Bell ("it was harder in some ways to make that assessment from Vietnam than it was to be back home. Being there in the early seventies, I suppose I’m going to get laughed down by half the audience. But militarily, we were not losing the war in ’70 and ’71 in terms of battles fought. You didn’t see it in Vietnam.") Who created that doubt, that skepticism, if not the media? Even if the hand on the trap door was in Congress, the verdict was inspired by an unrelenting stream of negative ink or ions from the media.

There is an inconsistency that the degree of hazard in Iraq is greater than it was in Vietnam, but the casualties (other than Truth) are an order of magnitude less. The statements made about the honor and competency of the troops and the policies and the acknowledgement of voter responsibility would have been reassuring to hear if they had been stated at an earlier date. Dan Rather said " I think it is a great mistake, particularly for those who were not alive or at memory age at the time, or even those who were, whose memories got jaded by-- In some cases not jaded, were so emotionally influenced by the disaster the war turned out to be, to forget that those who fought it were there because we sent them there. They went there for the right reason." I'll take that as being as close to an apology we will ever get from the media.

[1] "The Americans might force the Vietnamese to accept the disorder for years, but behind the dam of American troops and American money the pressure is building towards one of those sudden historical shifts when "individualism" and it attendant corruption gives way to the discipline of the revolutionary community. . . .the moment has arrived for the narrow flame of revolution to cleanse the lake of Vietnam Society from the corruption and disorder of the American war." Francis Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, Vintage Books, 1972, p. 590.

[2] see Department of Army General Order 1971-55, Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry w/Palm Citation for 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, for action in and through this area.